here is a good chance that the Uruguay Round will be successfully concluded by the end of 1993. Negotiations on agriculture have for a long time been the centre piece and the stumbling block of the whole Round. With the breakthrough achieved by the Blair House agreement, the prospects are good for the process of bringing agriculture fully into the GATT This could herald the end of a period during which agriculture and its trade were not considered suitable for GATT rules and disciplines applicable to other goods.
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Although the Uruguay Round negotiations are about the future, it is worthwhile to look into the past and to analyse what has brought the EC and the US to their present day situation. One should not throw stones if sitting in a glass house; therefore, some windows in the EC glass house should be opened by admitting that things have gone wrong in the CAP as well as in US agricultural policy. Six theses describe from an EC perspective the role which the US has played in international agricultural trade.
Mutual Dependence

The overall trade relationship between the EC and the US has always been prosperous and balanced.
Traditionally, the EC and the US have been each other's largest trading partners. Last year, the overall bilateral trade flow was substantial, amounting to approximately $200 billion, with $95.9 billion of EC exports to the US and $102.8 billion of US exports to the EC. With respect to agricultural trade, US farm exports to the EC amounted to * Both Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Belgium. The views expressed in the article do not represent the official position of the EC Commission but are the personal opinions of the authors.
INTERECONOMICS, September/October 1993 $6.9 billion while EC farm exports to the US totalled $4.7 billion. It is a relatively small amount of trade, and yet, unfortunately, it constitutes a large percentage of trade disputes between the EC and the US.
For the past forty years, the transatlantic partnership has been based upon mutual dependence. Europe recognised the role which the US played in its security. In the US view, the economic well-being and security of Western Europe was intertwined with and could not be divorced from its own security. This led to a large degree of similarity in US and European security and economic agendas. The US was convinced that the economic health of the Community was an essential component in the struggle against communism. With the Marshall Plan, the US undertook a long-term programme to assist economic recovery and political integration in Europe. As the creation of a common market for industrial goods in the Community was not possible without at the same time creating a common market for agricultural goods, the US had also to accept the establishment of a common agricultural policy.
Thanks to the fast growing demand and some basic inconsistencies (disharmonies) in the Community's external and internal protection (zero protection for oilseeds and cereal substitutes and high internal prices for competing products such as cereal and butter), the Community remained a net importer for two decades. As a result, the full extent of the basic inconsistencies of the CAP was neither seen nor felt by the US for a long time.
On the contrary, the US benefited to a large extent from the CAP, exporting more cereals and cereal substitutes than a more market-oriented CAP would have allowed. The more negative aspects of the CAP, in the form of a growing export potential and the Community's increasing share of world markets for major agricultural products, materialised only at a later stage in the early 1980s. It was then that the Community changed from a net importer into a net exporter, becoming the second largest exporter of food after the US.
With both partners together occupying one half or more of the world market for major agricultural products, it is evident that the respective agricultural policies affect one another considerably. It is not surprising that on occasion agricultural trade disputes overshadow to a large extent the good political relationship between the EC and the US, starting with the so-called "chicken war" in the 1960s and culminating in the recently resolved oilseeds dispute.
"Food for the Hungry World"
2. The US (and others) have carried out an agricultural policy which best suited the development of their agriculture.
In the early 1930s after the Great Depression, the US introduced internal price support mechanisms and the concept of an equitable income for the family farm to restore the farm economy and discourage migration. At that time, itwas clearly felt that the prevailing world market prices were not sufficient to maintain adequate internal farm incomes. The concepts of price support and equitable income later served as a model, in particular in Europe for the CAP, as a means to support farm incomes.
After the Second World War, US farm policy started to become export-oriented for the first time by introducing "food for the hungry world" policies. This phase went along with the introduction of further instruments of internal and external price stabilisation. By the middle of the 1970s, the arsenal of instruments was nearly complete, with the existence of target prices, loan rates, deficiency payments, export credits and food aid. These instruments were mainly deployed for products for which the US thought it had a certain comparative advantage (cereals, oilseeds, poultry and citrus fruit). Not surprisingly, this "arms race" resulted in rapidly expanding US agricultural exports. The US thus became acquainted with the idea that it alone was responsible for feeding the world and tried to instill in its farmers and the world the beliefthat its export performance in agriculture was solely the product of its higher productivity and competitiveness.
The US also introduced export promotion programmes, subsidising the disposal of its surplus production with aid/ assistance programmes and credit guarantee programmes, then later introducing such programmes as the Export Enhancement Programme (EEP) and the Targeted Export Assistance Programme (TEA). Unlike the 208 direct export subsidies in the EC, US export subsidies are concealed and more difficult to quantify. Soon after World War II, when production controls failed to hold supplies in balance with demand, the US Congress passed the Agriculture and Trade Development and Assistance Act, Public Law 480, or Food for Peace. Conceived for altruistic purposes, R L. 480 also served to increase foreign demand and dispose of surplus commodity stocks. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, food aid under P.L. 480 accounted for between one quarter and one half the value of all agricultural exports. The credit programmes, Export Credit Guarantee programme (GSM-102), one of the largest US export promotion programmes, and the Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee programme (GSM-103), have allowed countries to repay loans at subsidised rates. In 1983, for example, the US sold one million tonnes of subsidised wheat to Egypt under a credit guarantee programme.
Externalisation of Internal Problems
The Food Security Act of 1985 introduced an export subsidy programme to recapture lost markets. The Export Enhancement Programme required the USDA to use Commodity Credit Corporation stocks to subsidise exports of US wheat to a number of countries, targeting in particular Mediterranean rim markets (Algeria and Egypt) which were traditional EC markets. Such a programme, however, hurts not only the EC but other cereal exporters, such as Canada, Australia and Argentina. In order to capture market shares, the US not only targeted their exports at specific markets, but also pursued a policy of price undercutting. As the Community responded to this policy by matching US prices, the other wheat exporting countries were most concerned by the downward spiral which this "catch-as-catch-can" policy caused.
In parallel to export-oriented policy instruments, in the early 1950s the US developed the necessary protectionist tools to insulate certain agricultural sectors against imported products by applying quantitative import restrictions (Section 22 products). Against this historical background, the US should not be surprised when other countries, in the face of similar economic and social problems, have been inspired to some extent by American agricultural and trade policy to develop similar agricultural instruments and policies.
In fact, state intervention in agriculture is nothing new or novel. As Socrates, the Greek philosopher, observed, "Nobody is qualified to become a statesman who is entirely ignorant of wheat." The US, together with other industrialised countries, has developed during this century a panoply of government intervention
